This article intervenes into the debate around European identity, political Islam, and
Introduction
Samuel Huntington's provocative 1993 essay, "The clash of civilizations?" appeared at a time of tremendous geopolitical, social and intellectual change. This was especially true of Europe during the 1990s with the reconfiguration of Western Europe's political, legal and economic space through the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union. In many respects, the Maastricht Treaty had the effect of creating a 'core' of European integration, and alongside it, arguably also created a core of 'Europe.' As new states emerged in East-Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe violently exploded in ethnic violence. The stark dichotomy between 'Western Europe' and 'Eastern Europe' was transformed into new distinctions between 'European' and 'unEuropean' amid a renewed debate about Europe as a cultural and political space.
The political and perhaps cultural definition as well of Europe increasingly seems * to be one defined in terms of proximity in geography as well political and economic practices to Western Europe -or the core of Europe and European-ness. As a new geopolitical definition of Europe was framed in the 1990s, Eastern European countries looking to secure their independence and reassertion of their national trajectories as 'European' countries began their 'return to Europe' by seeking membership in Western Europe's political, economic and security arrangements to both re-establish their 'European' credentials as much as to benefit from Western Europe's economic strength (Iankova, 2006) . In effect, 'Europe' as a political and cultural space and as an identity category is produced by interactions between dominant and subordinate discourses (Kuus, 2004 :472,474: Lefebvre, 2001 ).
Amidst this period of change, Huntington's essay connected two important themes: first, a cultural and geopolitical imagination of Western Europe -and the United States -as the bastion of progress, rationality and order, in essence of modernity, or simply put as the benchmark of modern civilization, and secondly, his essay mapped out new geopolitical boundaries for a European world where national and cultural identities were increasingly questioned and where the perceived threat posed by immigration and integration to redraw the imagined character of nations raises fundamental questions about the place of the state, religion, and the nation in the complex relationship that is sovereignty. The immigration debate has become one of the central questions confronting the European Union; indeed, as a special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies on migration and minorities in Europe succinctly put it,
The current political context in Europe -between the first and second round of the EU's eastward enlargement and at a time when the whole notion of a EU constitution and future enlargement (in particular in the case of Turkey) have been called into question by the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty makes discussion about minorities and migration issues particularly relevant (Sasse and Thielemann, 2005:655) .
In the case of migration and the growth of the Muslim population in European States
there is an increasing sense among some that Muslim culture and European -or Christian -culture constitute opposing projects. One pair of observers have gone so far as to comment that " [g] eopolitics are increasingly being interpreted as a clash between the secular west (Europe and America) and societies in which religion plays a more prominent role in public life" (Rogowski &Turner, 2006:13) . Likewise, Reza Aslan has written that conflict between the West and Islam is not a Clash of Civilizations but rather a 'clash of monotheisms ' (2005:xv A nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as 'subjects' of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. There is thus an identity of character between state and people. … In it, ideally, there is a basic equivalence between the borders and the character of the political unit upon one hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other (Hastings, 1996: 3).
Europe's challenge is two-fold challenge: first, negotiating its external boundaries, of which Turkey is a prime example; and second, negotiating its internal cultural dimension of which the questions of religion, migration, and the Muslim population are core issues (Delanty, 2006:139; Dittmer, 2005:78; Scott, 2005:432) . It is increasingly possible to speak of multiple Europes that correspond to neither the discursive framework of membership in the European Union nor the core boundaries of the European Nation-state (Kuus, 2005:567) .
Making Modern Europe?
The very idea of Europe-ness or belonging to Europe, and, therefore, questions about Turkey and Islam in Europe, "involves a demarcation with respect to the nonEuropean" (Strath, 2000:405) . The speed at which Eastern and Central Europe was incorporated into the European discourse as 'returning to Europe' starkly contrasts Turkey's efforts to join first the European Community (EC), and now, the EU. While Turkey applied for membership in 1987 to the then-EC seven years prior to the Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC) applications to join its successor, it was only in October 2005 that Turkey began accession talks while the CEECs, the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta, and the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had already gained membership (Nugent, 2004:39) . It is perhaps accurate to say that the project of European integration is underwritten by a fundamental question that defines both Eastern enlargement as well as the potential geographic and cultural limits of Europe: Is 'Europe' a political, a geographically defined or a cultural/ civilizational project? Valerie Giscard D'Estaing, formerly the chair of the Convention for the Drafting the European Constitution, somewhat famously remarked "that an unbridgeable cultural divide existed between Turkey and Europe"; his assertion that Turkey is not a European country and that its membership would bring about the end of the EU highlights such a civilization or cultural imagination of Europe (WRR, 2004:15,22 . Glavanis, 1998:392 (Ballard, 1996) . (Neilson, 2004:18-19; Baban, 2006:186) .
In similar events to the controversy over the publication of The Satanic Verses, elsewhere" (Silverstein, 2005:366) . Tariq Ramadan has noted that to be critical of Western European or American treatment of Muslims and be a Muslim is discursively redacted into a oppositional binary, that is to say, one is more Muslim then French, or Dutch, or American, for example, and thus closes off the debate about multiculturalism into questions of loyalty and the maintenance of the cultural and political status quos (Silverstein 2005:29) . On the national and local levels, the construction of mosques, the shift in demographics, and the emergence of assertive migrant communities making spatial and identity claims create not only ethnic spaces and reshape the local face, they also reshape national space from the local level upwards (Hudson, 2000:409-10 " And then he delivered his personal message to Nicolas Sarkozy, the hard-line interior minister and leading right-wing candidate to succeed Jacques Chirac as French president, in words that I will never forget. "Moi," said Abdelaziz Eljaouhari, in a ringing voice, "Moi, je suis la France!" (Ash, 2006) That simple, yet striking evocation, "Je suis la France," gets to the core of Europe's identity crisis. Alongside migration from former colonies in North African and South
Asia to the United Kingdom, France, and The Netherlands and labour migration to
Germany from Turkey changes in Europe have redrawn the political and cultural formations of both the locality as well as the national identity. Anssi Passi points out a tendency to speak of Europe and the European Union as one and the same entity. This is revealing of how deeply the discursive framework of Europe and producing Europe has been enveloped within and in some senses been taken over by the political and economic performances of Europe as a social, geographic and cultural space linked with European integration (Passi, 2005:582) . The civilization question notwithstanding, Germany's Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has commented that, "European enlargement will have to end somewhere" (Hudson, 2000:411) . On a continental level the accession of Turkey would expand the European Union's political and geographical borders creating a shared border with Iran, Syria, the Republic of Georgia and Armenia. Such a wide reaching expansion holds important ramifications for the imagination of Europe's physical and cultural boundaries. As the borders of Europe are pushed further from the 'core', questions about a European identity are being pushed to the forefront.
On the national level, the immigration question has intensified debate about the social and cultural practices that define national identity, just as enlargement has done politically for Europe. Henkel has argued the growing presence and practice of religious Muslims, and the growth of Islamic religious/cultural associations and institutions has advanced an "extraordinary provocation" to liberal society already anxious over their Muslim populations (Henkel, 2006:2-3 (Cesari, 2005:4) . Taking into account that Europe currently has a population of approximately 23 million Muslims, or comprising around 5% of Europe's population, the addition of Turkey would only bolster that figure to around 15% (Savage, 2004:26-27 (Savage, 2004:28) .
Robert Leiken, Director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center writes in the same journal that catapulted the "clash thesis" to fame, "Muslims of western Europe are likely to be distinct, cohesive and bitter" (Leiken, 2005:120-35) . The bitterness Leiken points to hints at the frustrations of Muslims in Europe as they engage in the social and political emancipation processes through which minority groups attempt to acquire a place within the Nation-State. Muslims, Thijl Sunier argues, are obliged to organize themselves as Muslims in order to bring the associational and community aspects of their identity together to pursue political goals relative to their position in the host society (2005:321).
National identity and European identity are locked into a binary; migration is changing the National character as upward pressure on the nation-state while European political integration compresses the traditional markers of the State while perhaps also framing new external boundaries that supplant the nation-state's (Asad, 2002:217) . The public sphere where identity is presented and debated is conceptualized by Liberal idealism as a value-neutral space, but is, in fact, quite the opposite. It is a space framed by discourses of national, cultural and even continental imaginations, such as the imagined nature of the community and the nation (Sunier, 2005:325; Wimmer 2002:85-87 France's second largest religious denomination (Pauly, 2004:33,36 ).
This migrant body brought with them their religious and cultural traditions, and,
given their marginalization in French society, the retention of these identities, especially in the face of exclusion, was central to both individual as well as the community's integrity and survival (Pauly 2004:37; Neilson 1999:8) . As France's foreign labour by their own request and automatically at age 18 (Benhabib, 2004:157) . In contrast to first generation Muslims, second and third generations of Muslims, raised, educated and socialized to the values of French society and culture, were less wiling to abide continued marginalization and wrestled with being both French by citizenship and Muslim by religion and culture (Pauly, 2004:49) . As French-Algerian writer Sadek Sellam points out, having seen the way their parents were received in French society and, likewise, how they as second-and third-generation Muslims were received, they advanced a fundamental challenge to the French political identity by demanding and asserting a stake in that identity through political, cultural and social institutions which paralleled and even began to challenge French institutions (Pauly, 2004:49) .
Unemployment among France's Muslim youth, with unemployment rates high among French youth in general as the recent attempt to introduce the first contract laws reflect, are strikingly higher and increasingly seen as racially motivated among Muslims;
for them, the Banlieues become spaces of exclusion (Pauly, 2004:55) . Here in the Banlieues the contest for space takes center stage: the contest for Mosques and the attendant spiritual requirements of Muslim faith. The building of a mosque is a visual and architectural statement that French society has changed permanently. James Corbett has argued that France has never been a multicultural society: foreigners are expected to fit into the French model (Pauly, 2004:46) . The Mosque as both physical and cultural space is therefore a reshaping of the visible face of the local community as Islam moves from the private sphere to the public. Jocelyne Cesari writes the "mosque is central to Islam's urban visibility and is the centre of Muslim communal life. It is not only a space for prayer but also a "community centre; where pre-existing social networks of solidarity come together…" (Cesari, 2005 (Cesari, :1017 . The building of a mosque reflects not only a community centre, physically, but also a claim on permanence and presence. Cesari argues that the act of requesting space, that is seeking building permits, or engaging in the bureaucratic process of purchasing land for a purpose built religious space represents a dialogue between Islamic and secular society. As France's Muslim population has grown beyond the confines of prayer rooms in the back of stores and private homes the necessity of larger purpose built religious spaces began to reshape the public's awareness of Islam. In the case of Mantes-la-jolie, stiff resistance against the purchase of space within the town core and tensions within the local community and among local politicians was the most significant factor in the contest for space. Indeed, it seems remarkably ironic that efforts to build a new large mosque in Marseilles were stalled not by mainstream French society and politicians but rather by a rift between Muslim groups over control of the mosque. It is even more striking that local non-Muslim politicians played the role of intermediary and mediator between two separate Muslim groups (Cesari, 2005 (Cesari, :1032 . In the case of Marseilles, during the peak of controversy and tensions between French society and Muslim society, the local mayor voiced strong support for the building of a large mosque. He was widely attacked from across the political spectrum and especially by the far right for his position (Neilson, 2004:165 In contrast to voices from the right, such as Le Pen, who constantly evoke an anti-migrant anti-minority platform, the election campaign of Jean-Claude Gaudin for mayor of strictly national citizenship and identity as they force a retelling of the national myth in which the stakeholders have changed (Benhabib, 2004:190) . Nations do not exist in time eternal, but rather must be imagined and reaffirmed constantly (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995) . As the demographic and cultural make-up of French society changes and as second and third generations of Muslims increasingly take a more active role and engage in the public discourse of French society, the visible, physical, and architectural face of French society and the public sphere is likewise changing.
Holland
In Holland, the contest for public space, as in France, is equally intertwined with the changing shape of the nation and debates over whether Muslims can belong to the Nation, and if so, can they maintain their own cultural and religious identities within the public sphere (Sunier, 2005:319) . The parallels with France are striking, as religion in the Netherlands is increasingly being pushed from the public sphere as the defining character of the Nation -it is worth recalling the Calvinist heritage of the Netherlands -the growth of the Netherlands' Muslim community and the emergence of Islamic communities and associations have increasingly placed religion back on the public agenda.
As in France, the local Muslim community tends to live in the poorer suburbs of larger cities, in the achterstandswijken, or backwards neighbourhoods where they have developed and utilized a network of private and communal arrangements to cater for personal and community needs, such as private prayer rooms that emerged first to cater to temporary migrant workers (Sunier, 2005: 326) . The turning point was reached when both the Muslim community and local governments realized that the 'myth of return' was exactly that, and that the Netherlands' Muslim population was a permanent fixture.
Muslim migration into the Netherlands, as was the case in France, initially stemmed from The Netherlands' former colonial possessions and economic migration.
Turkish migrants comprise the largest source of Muslim immigration, and as in France, the migrant body has used family reunification laws to reunite families in the Netherlands. Dutch statistics placed Holland's foreign born Muslim population at 405,000 in 1989, a decade later those numbers had grown to 700,000, with those from Turkish extraction making at the largest segment at 285,000 (Savage, 2004:32) . Over two-thirds of Dutch Muslims now hold citizenship (Neilson, 2004:63) . There are some key differences in terms of the contest for space: first of all, unlike German and French citizenship models, the Dutch model grants city-voting rights to those who have been resident in a city after five years. This translates into non-nationals, such as migrants or those on work contracts, after five years obtaining a stake in shaping the local political environment, and through the local level influencing the national level (Benhabib, 2004:157-58) . representative put it, after nearly two decades of conflict over the building the mosque:
We do not want an ugly big white pastry in our neighbourhood, like you sometimes see when they build a new mosque. Our mosque will be completely in style of the 'Amsterdam school' (architectural style) so that it fits perfectly in the neighbourhood and becomes a real Dutch mosque (Sunier, 2005:325) .
The decision to design the mosque in line with the Amsterdam school of design represents as much Dutch local fears and resistance to the Islamicization of Amsterdam as it does a conflict over the use of the particular site (Sunier, 2005:88) .
In Rotterdam, the local Muslim association's plan to build the "biggest mosque in
Europe" likewise ignited a heated debate not only about architecture and visible space, but also the core identity of Dutch society and the place, if any for Islam in Dutch society (Sunier, 2005:325) . (Sunier, 2005:324) . These events shifted concerns about migrants and Islam back onto the level of national identity, with laws now in place to restrict the import of Imams from outside of the Netherlands over concerns that imported Imams will bring non-Dutch perspectives and fundamentalism into Holland and radicalize Muslims in Dutch society (Sunier, 2005:92 as an emerging pan-national political body and as a political culture for the future (Asad, 2002:213) . The clash of civilizations thesis is constantly evoked to reduce the cultural meaning of Europe as a space into a new binary of European /modern and Islam/backwards as Europe grapples with the external boundaries of both the nation-state and the political integration project. Boundaries are negotiated spaces both on the individual and the international level. The debate over Turkey is perhaps the mirror image of Europe's efforts to find itself in a changing world.
